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The Impact of Social Security
and Other Factors on the
Distribution of Wealth
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ
3.1 Introduction
As documented in Feldstein (1976) and Auerbach et al. (1995), the post-
warp eriod has witnessed a dramatic increase in the annuitization of the
resources of America’s elderly. Indeed, between 1960 and 1990, the annui-
tized share of resources of older men doubled, and that of older women
quadrupled. Social Security is the main force behind this process, but
Medicare and Medicaid as well as private pensions play an important role
in replacing household wealth accumulation with survival-dependent old-
ager esource streams. Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ,a nd Sabelhaus (1996) suggest
that the increased annuitization may explain the signiﬁcant postwar rise
in the propensity of the elderly to consume their remaining lifetime re-
sources. Gokhale et al. (2001) consider a related point, namely, that in-
creased annuitization will reduce bequests. This is particularly the case for
lower-income households, who face Social Security taxation on all of their
earnings and for whom Social Security replaces a higher share of preretire-
ment income. Thanks to Social Security, these households have less to
save, and less reason to save, than upper-income households. Thus, they
arrive at olda ge with relatively little net worth available to bequeath. In
diﬀerentially disenfranchising the children of the poor from the receipt of
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85inheritances, Social Security may be materially altering the distribution
of wealth.
This chapter builds on Gokhale et al. (2001) in trying to understand
how Social Security and other factors aﬀectw e alth inequality. Speciﬁcally,
this chapter uses lifetime earnings data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to calibrate Gokhale et al.’s (2001) bequest simulation
model. The model features random death based on age-sex mortality prob-
abilities, random fertility, assortative mating, heterogeneous human capital
endowments, heterogeneous rates of return, the inheritability of human
capital, progressive income taxation, and the partial annuitization through
Social Security of households’ retirement savings. Agents have no bequest
motive.T hey live for a maximum of eighty-eight years, the ﬁrst twenty-
two as children, the second twenty-two as young married adults who have
children, the third twenty-two as middle-aged adults raising children, and
the last twenty-two as elderly individuals who die at random. Surviving
spouses inherit all their partners’ wealth but bequeath their own wealth in
equal portions to their children.
Gokhale et al. (2001) use synthetic data generated by CORSIM—a mi-
cro simulation model—in conjunction with cross-section earnings data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to calibrate the distribution
of lifetime labor earnings. Surprisingly, their simulated distribution of
wealth held by those reaching retirement closely matches that observed in
the SCF. This is particularly true at the upper tail of the wealth distribu-
tion.I naddition to matching the wealth distribution, Gokhale et al. de-
compose the inﬂuence of various factors, including Social Security, on
wealth inequality. They show that, in the absence of Social Security, inheri-
tances would reduce slightly the degree of wealth inequality. In Social Se-
curity’s presence,h owever, they ﬁnd that inheritances signiﬁcantly exacer-
bate wealth inequality.
While intriguing, Gokhale et al.’s results should be viewed with caution,
given the synthetic generation of lifetime earnings upon which they rely.
This chapter attempts to alleviate that shortcoming by considering actual
lifetime earnings as reported in the long PSID panel. The availability of
actual lifetime earnings also permits a more accurate calibration of the
degree of assortative mating and inheritability of skills. These advantages
must be set against a key disadvantage: The PSID does not adequately
capture the skewness in the upper tail of the distribution of lifetime earn-
ings. Since the upper tail of the distribution of lifetime earnings plays such
ak ey role in determining the upper tail of the distribution of wealth, this
paperf ocuses on the shape of the distribution of wealth in the bottom half
of the wealth distribution.
Because we are using the PSID to generate the distribution of lifetime
earnings, and because the PSID data suggest a rather minor degree of
assortative mating, our simulated distribution of wealth holdings among
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Gokhale et al. (2001). It is also less skewed than the 1995 SCF and 1984
PSID wealth distributions of married households aged sixty to sixty-nine.
Although we are less successful than Gokhale et al. (2001) in matching
the upper tail of the wealth distribution, we continue to conﬁrm Feldstein’s
(1976) ﬁnding that Social Security plays an important role in making
wealth holdings less equal. The Gini coeﬃcientf or ours imulated distribu-
tion of wealth is 16 percent higher in the presence of Social Security than
in its absence, and Social Security raises the share of wealth held by the
wealthiest 10 percent of retiring households by almost one quarter.
Thep aper proceeds in section 3.2 with a brief literature review. Section
3.3 draws heavily on Gokhale et al. (2001) in describing the model and
proceedst odiscuss the model’s calibration. Section 3.4 presents results,
and section 3.5 draws conclusions.
3.2 Related Literature
Harbury and Hitchens (1979) and Menchik (1979) are well-cited studies
that connect the wealth of sons to the estates of their fathers. While sugges-
tive, their data do not necessarily imply that inherited wealth is a source
of inequality.1 Nevertheless, they reinforced Meade’s (1976) view that in-
heritances exacerbate wealth inequality—a conclusion supported by the
theoretical model of Wilhelm (1997). Stiglitz (1969) and Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) oﬀered an alternative perspective: They showed that, under
certain assumptions, a stable, egalitarian distribution of wealth would
emerge if inheritances were distributed evenly among all of one’s children.
Them odels by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Tomes (1981) go beyond
these studies in examining the joint role that inheritances of ﬁnancial
wealth and earning power (human capital) play in determining whether
intergenerational transfers are equalizing. Laitner (1979a, b) constructs a
utility-maximizing framework in which parents care about both their own
and their children’s consumption, bequests must be nonnegative, and there
is no inheritability of human capital. He shows that an equilibrium wealth
distribution exists and that inheritances are equalizing if there is no as-
sortative mating—an issue ﬁrst examined by Blinder (1973). The studies
of Meade (1964), Stiglitz (1969), Pryor (1973), Atkinson and Harrison
(1978), and Atkinson (1980) also stress the role of imperfect correlation of
spouses’ inheritances in equalizing the distribution of inheritances.2
1. Their data record the total value of the father’s estate, rather than the amount actually
inherited by the son. Their ﬁndings may be explained, in large part, by the sons’ inheritances
of their fathers’ human capital.
2. Theoretical work on taxation provides additional grounds for believing that inheritances
aree q ualizing. Becker and Tomes (1979) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) show that inheri-
tance taxation can increase income inequality. However, if there are incomplete markets,
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Flemming (1976), Oulton (1976), and Wolfson (1977). Their central ﬁnd-
ing is that, absent bequests, the life-cycle model is unable to explain the
upper tail of the wealth distribution. Wolfson (1979) and Davies (1982)
add bequests, speciﬁcally desired bequests, and generate much more real-
istic skewness in the distribution of wealth.
Flemming (1979) is the closest antecedent to our work. He, too, consid-
ers earnings heterogeneity and the inheritability of skills, but not marriage,
assortative mating, or heterogeneity in the number and spacing of chil-
dren. Flemming ﬁnds that wealth is much more unequally divided than
earnings and that both unintended and intended bequests can markedly
increase wealth inequality. Although many of our ﬁndings agree with
Flemming’s, we ﬁnd that, in the absence of Social Security, unintended
bequests serve to slightly reduce intragenerational wealth inequality.
3.2.1 Empirical Support for Excluding Altruism
Although Laitner and Juster (1996) provide some limited support for
altruism, most recent studies do not. To be precise, Boskin and Kotlikoﬀ
(1985), Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoﬀ (1992, 1997), Abel and Kotlikoﬀ
(1994), Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoﬀ (1996), Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ,a n d
Sabelhaus (1996), Wilhelm (1996), and Hurd (1992) show that (a) the dis-
tribution of consumption across cohorts is very strongly dependent on the
cross-cohort distribution of resources, (b) the distribution of consumption
within extended families is very strongly dependent on the distribution of
resources within extended families, (c) that taking a dollar from a child
and handing it to parents who are actively transferring income to that
child leads the parent to hand back only thirteen cents to the child, (d)
that the very major postwar increase in the annuitization of the resources
of the elderly has not been even partially oﬀsetb ya nincrease in their
holdings of life insurance, (e) that the vast majority of bequests are distrib-
uted equally among children independent of their economic needs, and
(f) the presence of children does not inﬂuence postretirement dissaving.
Individually and as a group, these studies constitute very strong evidence
against intergenerational altruism, suggesting that most bequests may be
unintended or motivated by nonaltruistic considerations—the modeling
assumption made here.3
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such as the market for educational loans considered by Loury (1981), redistributive taxation
of bequests can reduce intragenerational inequality.
3. Of course, the Bill Gateses and Warren Buﬀets of the world are not making unintended
bequests. Unlike most people, they may be able to aﬀord their altruism because of their high
levels of income. Stated diﬀerently, many households may be altruistic, but their degrees of
altruism are so small that, given their resources, they choose not to allocate resources toward
intentional, altruistically motivated bequests.It is frequently observed that retired consumers save rather than dissave.
Prima facie this might indicate a bequest motive in some form (Hurd
1990). However, Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ,a nd Sabelhaus (1996) and Miles
(1997) point out that when wealth is calculated to include the capitalized
value of Social Security receipts, it falls throughout retirement. Hurd also
concludes from a careful analysis of panel and cross-section data that the
evidence on wealth changes is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis and
the view that bequests are accidental.
Meade (1966) and Flemming (1976) provide a ﬁnal reason to doubt
the prevalence of altruistically motivated bequests. They pointed out that
anything less than very strong altruism would not suﬃce to generate ubiq-
uitous and signiﬁcant bequests because the lifetime incomes of children
signiﬁcantly exceed those of their parents.
3.3 The Model and Its Calibration
This section describes the model’s demographic structure, skill alloca-
tion, determination of inheritance, and consumption and saving behavior.
3.3.1 Demographics
Agents can live for eighty-eight periods, the ﬁrst twenty-two of which
they spend as children whose consumption is ﬁnanced by their parents.
All events, including earnings, consumption, marriages, births, deaths, and
wealth transfers, occur at the end of each period. Agents marry on their
twenty-second birthday. They give birth to children at ages twenty-two
through forty-three, depending on their draw from a “birth matrix” de-
scribedbelow. They also enter the work force on their twenty-second birth-
dayandworkthroughagesixty-six.Theyfacepositiveprobabilitiesofdying
between ages sixty-seven and eighty-eight. The probability of an agent’s
dying on her eighty-eighth birthday, given that she has lived to that date, is
100 percent. The probabilities of dying at ages sixty-seven through eighty-
sevena re taken from U.S. mortality statistics.
Then umber, sexes, and timing of children born to each couple are deter-
mined randomly. This distribution is aligned to ensure that 2,000 males
and 2,000 females are born each year. There is no population growth, so
total annual births remain ﬁxed through time.
3.3.2 Consumption and Saving Behavior
Agents’ expected utilities are time-separable isoelastic functions of their
own current and future consumption as well as that of their children
through age twenty-two. Consider, as an example, the expected utility
(EU) of a couple, aged twenty-three, who will have two children, one when
the couple are aged twenty-ﬁve and the other when they are twenty-eight:
















































In equation (1), the ﬁrst summation considers the utility of each spouse
from his or her own consumption at each possible age to which each could
live. The second two summations consider the utility that the couple derive
from the consumption of their two children. The terms cha, cwa, ck1a,a n d
ck2a refer, respectively, to the consumption of the husband, wife, ﬁrst child,
and second child when the couple is age a.T h eterm  is the time-
preference factor,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and  is
the child consumption weighting factor.
As  approaches zero, households become more and more reluctant to
consume smaller amounts in the future than they consume in the present.
Since the inverse of  is the household’s coeﬃcientofr elative risk aversion,
av alue of close to zero translates into a coeﬃcient of risk aversion close
to inﬁnity. In our simulations, we assume that  is very close to zero. Hall
(1988) reports that there is “no strong evidence that the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution is positive. Earlier ﬁndings of substantial positive
elasticities are reversed when appropriatee stimation methods are used.”
Although Hall’s ﬁndings are based on a highly stylized model, assuming
that  is very close to zero enormously simpliﬁes the consumption deci-
sionso fo ur model’s households. First, this assumption in conjunction with
the assumption of a time preference rate equal to the interest rate means
that households seek to maintain the same level of consumption over time
fore ach spouse. Households also seek to maintain a constant level of con-
sumption for their children, while they are children. Given the value of ,
this child consumption level equals 40 percent of the parental consump-
tion level.
Most important, however, our assumption that  is very close to zero
means that households only consider their safe resources in deciding how
much to consume at each point in time. Thus, households who expect to
receive an inheritance, but are uncertain of receiving one (because all of
their parents may live to age eighty-eight), will ignore this potential source
of future income in making their current consumption and saving deci-
sions.
At each point in time, married households will calculate the number of
yearso fr e maining life, multiply this amount by two (to take into account
the presence of both spouses) and then add to the resulting value 0.4 times
the number of years of consumption of their children. This total number
of eﬀective adult consumption years is then divided into the household’s
safe resources to determine consumption per eﬀective adult. The house-
hold’s safe resources consist of its wealth (which may reﬂect the receipt of
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earnings, which, by necessity, is assumed to be certain. Given the level
of consumption per eﬀective adult, it is straightforward to calculate total
household consumption and subtract it from total household income to
determine household saving.
We want to emphasize that inheritances aﬀectc o nsumption behavior,
buto nly once they are received. There is no consumption out of potential
future inheritances. Instead, households consider the worst-case scenario
at each point in time and formulate their consumption and saving plans
accordingly. Were we to assume a positive value of ,h o u s eholds would
take a gamble and consume more in the present in anticipation of a pos-
siblef uture inheritance. However, their decision as to how much to con-
sume would be extraordinarily complex. The reason is that at certain ages
they would have to take into account not simply their own resources, in-
cluding their own wealth, but also those of their parents and grandparents,
assuming their grandparents are still alive. Take, for example, a twenty-
ﬁve-year-old couple with two sets of living parents and four sets of living
grandparents. In deciding how much to consume, the household has to
consider its own current wealth level as well as the wealth levels of all six
parental and grandparental households. Formally, the dynamic program
that the household must solve to determine how much to consume involves
up to seven state variables, namely all seven of these wealth levels.4 Unfor-
tunately, solving dynamic programs with seven state variables appears to
be beyond the capacity of current computers.5
3.3.3 Assortative Mating
Agents are assigned their marriage partners at age twenty-two on a
partly systematic basis in which the probability of a match is higher the
closer are the respective skill ranks of the two partners. Our assortative
mating works as follows. We ﬁrst construct for each year of the simulation
av e c t o rA containing 2,000 random numbers drawn from a uniform distri-
bution with support (0, 1). Vector A is sorted in ascending order. Second,
av e c t o rB is constructed containing 2,000 random numbers from the same
distribution but is left unsorted. Third, vector C  A  (1  )B is con-
structed toyield anew vector ofnumbers betweenzero and one.Fourth, we
associatewiththeﬁrstelementoftheCvectortheinteger1,withthesecond
elementtheinteger2,andsoonuptothelastelementofC,towhichweasso-
ciate the integer 2,000. Fifth, we sort C such that C ends up in ascending
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4. We say “up to” because during years in which the household is aged sixty-six and over,
it has neither living parents nor living grandparents, and during years in which the household
is aged forty-four through sixty-ﬁve, it has no living grandparents.
5. The fact that even supercomputers would have diﬃculty solving this problem in a rea-
sonable amount of time raises the question of how mere mortals can actually deal with this
complexity.order and denote the associated integers as vector R.T his vector is used
to assign the husband’s skill rank, j,f or each female skill rank, where the
female skills are aligned in ascending order), i  1 ...2,000.
Fore xample, suppose that, for a given year, after the C vector has been
generated and sorted in ascending order, the ﬁrst three integers associated
with the ﬁrst three elements of the C vector are 3, 51, and 1,290. Then the
most skilled twenty-two-year-old female in that year will be married to the
3rd most skilled twenty-two-year-old male, the 2nd most skilled twenty-
two-year-old female will be married to the 51st most skilled twenty-two-
year-old male, and the 3rd most skilled twenty-two-year-old female will be
married to the 1,290th most skilled twenty-two-year-old male. The param-
eter  is chosen to reproduce the rank correlation coeﬃcient between hus-
bands’ and wives’ lifetime earnings, which we estimate in the PSID.
3.3.4 Inheritance of Skills
Thep rocedure just described for correlating husbands’ and wives’ life-
time earnings is also used to determine the correlation between fathers’
and sons’ lifetime earnings as well as the correlation between mothers’
and daughters’ lifetime earnings. In each case, the relevant parameter is
calibrated to reproduce the rank correlation coeﬃcient observed between
sons’ (daughters’) and fathers’ (mothers’) lifetime earnings. We use the
assumption that if sons (daughters) inherit skills, they do so from their
fathers (mothers), which, while both politically and genetically incorrect,
maintains tractability of the distribution of earnings through time of males
and females.
3.3.5 Fertility
An initial population (at time t  0) of 4,000 thousand individuals
(2,000 males and 2,000 females) was created for each age between zero
and eighty-seven. This was done as follows: First, a matrix of “birth ages”
was derived from a fertility simulation of CORSIM—a dynamic microsi-
mulation model of the U.S. economy described in Caldwell et al. (1999).
Thes imulation considered 40,434 females born between 1945 and 2000
and recorded their ages of giving birth if those ages fell between ages
twenty-two and forty-three. For each female in our CORSIM sample, we
stored this information in our CORSIM birth matrix, which accommo-
dates a maximum of ten birth ages, ﬁve for male and ﬁve for female births.
Thus, the matrix has 40,434 rows and ten columns. Table 3.1 shows the dis-
tribution of females in the CORSIM matrix by number and sex of births.
Because computer memory limitations allowed us to process only 4,000
individuals in each year of birth, we needed to pare down our birth matrix
in such a way as to end up with a modiﬁed birth matrix that contains
exactly 2,000 male births and 2,000 female births. We started by selecting
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without replacement, except that rows containing more than ﬁve births
were excluded. The total number of births in the selected 2,000-row matrix
exceeded 4,000. Hence, we randomly eliminated male and female births in
the rows of this matrix for rows containing more than one birth until we
were left with precisely 2,000 male and 2,000 female births. This guaran-
teed that the 2,000 rows of the ﬁnal birth matrix would generate exactly
2,000 female and 2,000 male births. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of
females by the number and sex of their births in the birth matrix used in
the simulation.
3.3.6 Populating the Model at Time Zero
We populated our model by ﬁrst creating 2,000 male and 2,000 female
olda dults for each age between sixty-seven and eighty-eight. These males
and females were then married to each other sequentially. Some of these
oldsters were treated as dead when we initiated the simulation, but we
needed to include their ghosts at this stage of our process of populating
the model in order to establish complete family trees. Marriage was al-
lowed only between people of the same age to be consistent with our as-
sumption that marriage occurs at age twenty-two (i.e., that initial oldster




Male Births CORSIM Data
0 20.68 12.94 6.96 1.49 0.33 0.10
1 13.64 14.77 5.32 1.38 0.35 0.13
2 7.83 5.06 2.16 0.70 0.24 0.12
3 1.87 1.38 0.64 0.23 0.12 0.05
4 0.41 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.00
5 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.00
Birth Matrix Used in Simulation
0 0.00 13.00 9.00 2.20 0.55 0.15
1 16.05 22.40 6.45 1.60 0.50 0.00
2 12.20 7.15 2.50 0.80 0.00 0.00
3 2.85 0.95 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CORSIM birth matrix.
Notes: CORSIM data represent females with at least one but fewer than ﬁve births numbered
40434. Selections from the birth matrix are restricted to females with one through ﬁve births,
male and female (shown in boldface type).
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brides were twenty-two). Family relationships were established by ex-
changing identiﬁcation numbers.
In our next step, we drew from the 2,000 rows of the birth matrix at
random (but without replacement) the middle-aged and young-adult chil-
dren of the initial oldsters, ranging in age from twenty-four through sixty-
six. In this process, we do not permit oldsters to bear children in their
twilight years; rather, we are retrospectively considering the births of the
initial oldsters when they were in their childbearing years.
Given that females give birth between the ages of twenty-two and forty-
three, oldsters aged eighty-eight at the initiation of our simulation (t  0)
have children who are aged forty-ﬁve through sixty-six; oldsters aged
eighty-seven at t  0h ave children aged forty-four through age sixty-ﬁve;
and so on, until we reach oldsters aged sixty-seven at t  0w h owould
have children aged between twenty-four and forty-ﬁve. Thus, at this stage
of ourp o pulating procedure, exactly 4,000 (the full complement of) forth-
ﬁve-year-olds and less then 4,000 thousand individuals at other ages be-
tween twenty-four and sixty-six have been created. The reasoni sthat ev-
eryone (including oldster ghosts) who could have given birth to forty-ﬁve-
year-olds has been considered, but not everyone who gave birth to those
between ages twenty-four and forty-four and those between ages forty-six
and sixty-six has been considered.
Because at this stage there are fewer than 4,000 middle-aged males and
females at ages forty-six to sixty-six, additional middle-aged males and
females are created for a total of 4,000 for each of these age groups. Next,
all middle-aged males and females (those aged forty-ﬁve through sixty-six)
were married at random, making sure that siblings were not married to
each other. Next, the children of middle-aged adults were created, again
taking draws without replacement from the birth matrix for females of a
given age and then doing the same for females of another age until all
females aged forty-ﬁve through sixty-six had been considered. The chil-
dren produced by this process range in age from two through forty-four.6
Given that we have already created the children of the t  0o ldsters, the
addition of these children leave us with exactly 2,000 males and 2,000
females aged twenty-three through forty-four—the young adults. The pro-
cedure just described was also used to marry the young adults.
Then ext step in the creation of the initial population was creating the
children of the t  0y oung adults that were born at t  1o re arlier.
Each young-adult female was assigned a row of the birth matrix at random
6. Sixty-six-year-olds have children aged between twenty-three and forty-four; sixty-ﬁve-
year-olds have children aged between twenty-two and forty-three; and so on through forty-
ﬁve-year-olds, who have children aged between two and twenty-three.
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the age at t  0o fthe female in question. For example, a forty-four-year-
oldf e male’s children were created for birth ages between twenty-two and
forty-three, but a twenty-three-year-old’s children are created only if her
birth row assignment contains a birth age of twenty-two. That is, children
that will be born at t  0o rl a t e rw e r en o tc r e a t e da sy et. At the end of
this process, exactly 2,000 males and 2,000 females had been created for
each age between one and eighty-eight. The ﬁnal step in creating the initial
population was to kill oﬀ oldsters (i.e., make the ghosts disappear) ac-
cording to their cumulative mortality probabilities.7
3.3.7 Populating the Model Through Time
In populating the model through time we do the following. First, for t 
0, we allocate at random and without replacement a row from the birth
matrix to all twenty-two-year-old females. Second, we marry twenty-two-
year-old males and females at random,o ra cc o r ding to the assortative mat-
ing procedure described above. Third, we have females aged twenty-two
to forty-three give birth as determined by their assigned birth matrix row,
creating 2,000 newborn (zero-year-old) males and 2,000 newborn (zero-
year-old) females. Fourth, we kill oﬀ oldsters at random according to the
conditional probability of dying at their respective ages. The wealth of
these oldsters is transferred to the surviving spouse or children. Finally,
we age everyone by one year.
3.3.8 Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
to Calculate Lifetime Earnings
The PSID began in 1968 with ar epresentative sample of 5,000 U.S.
households. The PSID has re-interviewed (or attempted to re-interview)
the individuals from those households every year since that time, regard-
lesso ftheir demographic status, living arrangements, etc. Children of orig-
inal PSID respondents have been followed after they have left their par-
ents’ households.
Forming longitudinal labor income proﬁles involves the following steps:
First, labor income, family number, and sex variables for “head” and
“wife” are extracted from the family ﬁle for year x and merged with the
individual ﬁle by year-x family number, retaining only those observations
that appearedi ny e a rx.8 Step 1 is repeated separately for each year from
7. The mortality probabilities are based on U.S. mortality tables. Conditional mortality
probabilities below age sixty-seven are set to zero, and the conditional mortality probability
at agee ighty-eight is set to unity. The probability of dying at age  a, da,i sc alculated as
da  (1 – a) a–1
s67 s,w here s is the conditional probability of surviving at age s.
8. The PSID’s ﬁle structure comprises one cross-year individual ﬁle and several single-year
family ﬁles. The cross-year individual ﬁle contains records for all individuals that ever ap-
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by “family interview number” and “person number” respectively, and all
are merged together to form a single “cross-year individual” ﬁle containing
individual longitudinal labor income proﬁles.
The PSID reports annual labor income in nominal dollars. To place the
income earned in diﬀerent years on a comparable basis, we divide each
year’s values by the ratio of that year’s Social Security Administration’s
average wage index to the average wage index in 1997. Using this wage
index to rescale nominal labor income adjusts not only for inﬂation but
also for labor productivity growth. We have selected 1997 as base year
because that year’s federal income tax rates and brackets are used to imple-
ment progressive income taxation in our simulation. Our motivation for
controlling for productivity growth in forming lifetime earnings is simple:
Our model does not account for productivity growth. Our next step is to
sort the cross-year individual ﬁle by sex.9
Not all individuals appear in the PSID in each year between 1968 and
1993. Moreover, some individuals appear as “head” or “wife” for just a
fewy ears. To ensure a minimum number of data points from which to
form lifetime earnings, we retained in our sample only those individuals
whoa ppear for at least ten years as “head” or “wife” between the ages of
twenty-three and sixty-six.
Since the PSID spans only twenty-six years, it cannot provide us with
earnings proﬁles for the full complement of forty-four years (from age
twenty-three to age sixty-six) of earnings—the lifetime earnings proﬁle as
required by our simulation. Hence, we adopt a procedure for extrapolating
each individual’s labor income both backward and forward as required.
First, we calculate average labor incomes for all males who appeared in
the sample (as “head” or “wife”) at each age between twenty-three and
sixty-six.10 This provides us with a benchmark age-earnings proﬁle for
males—M23–M66. This procedure is repeated for females to generate a
corresponding benchmark proﬁle for females—F23–F66.
Next, for each individual we calculate two average labor incomes for
each person. A1 is the average labor income over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the
peared in the survey—whether these individuals were members of the original sample of
households or households that formed after 1968. This individual ﬁle contains a “person
number” variable indicating the response status for each individual, which can be associated
with the family number to create a unique person identiﬁer. Unfortunately, the cross-year
individual ﬁle does not contain labor income for “head” and “wife” for all of the years.
Hence it was necessary to select these variables from the single-year family ﬁles and merge
them together to form individual longitudinal labor income proﬁles.
9. We classify appropriately female “heads” and male “wives.”
10. Thus, those who appeared in the sample at their age twenty-three are included in the
calculation of the average labor income for age twenty-three; those who appeared in the
sample at age twenty-four are included in the calculation of the average labor income at age
twenty-four, and so on through age sixty-six.
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the last ﬁve years that the person is present in the sample (as “head” or
“wife”). For example, if a female appeared in the sample at each age be-
tween thirty-ﬁve and ﬁfty-four, A1 would be her average labor income at
ages thirty-ﬁve through thirty-nine, and A2 would be average labor income
at ages ﬁfty through ﬁfty-four. A1 is used to extrapolate her labor income
backward—from age thirty-four through age twenty-three. Her imputed
income at age thirty-four equals A1 times the ratio of F34 to the average
of F35–F39; her imputed income at age thirty-three equals A1 times the
ratioo fF33 to the average of F35–F39, and so on. A similar procedure is
adopted when extrapolating individuals’ labor incomes forward—beyond
their oldest age as a PSID “head” or “wife” (ﬁfty-four for the male in the
current example) through age sixty-six.
The sample of individuals for whom we could compute/impute lifetime
earnings proﬁles in this manner included 4,706 males and 5,278 females.
However, our simulation includes only 2,000 individuals of each sex. To
arrive at 2,000 male and female lifetime earnings proﬁles, we proceed in
the following manner. First, we replicate each of the 4,706 male and 5,278
female observations in proportion to their sample population weights. Sec-
ond, we group to the nearest integer the “blown-up” males and females
into 0.05 percentiles of the present value of lifetime earnings. Third, we
pick the observation with the highest value of lifetime earnings in each of
the 0.05 percentiles. This gives us 2,000 males and 2,000 females whose
levela nd pattern of lifetime earnings are used in the simulation.
3.3.9 Calibrating the Degree of Assortative Mating
and the Inheritability of Skills
Armed with the original (not blown up by population weights) lifetime
earnings of the sample of 4,706 males and 5,278 females, we formed for
each year of the PSID sample the rank correlation coeﬃcients between (a)
the lifetime earnings of husbands and their wives observed in that year
and (b) the lifetime earnings of fathers (mothers) and sons (daughters)
observed in that year. The average (across all the years) values of the
husband-wife and same-sex parent-child rank correlation coeﬃcients are
0.10 and 0.44, respectively. These coeﬃcients are used to calibrate the pa-
rameters mentioned above.
Before proceeding, we should point out that the 0.10 husband-wife rank
correlation coeﬃcienti sq uite small relative to our priors. It is also much
smaller than the 0.70 guesstimate used by Gokhale et al. (2001). Although
this estimate suggests that assortative mating on the basis of lifetime earn-
ings may not be an important factor, one should bear in mind that the
PSID underrepresents upper-income earners for whom assortative mating
may be much more important.
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Whenaspouse dies, the surviving spouse retains all the couple’s marital
wealth. That is, all bequests of married agents go to their spouses. When
a widow or widower dies, or when both spouses die at the same time, the
wealth of the decedent(s) is evenly divided among the children.
3.3.11 Initial Wealth Endowments and Length of the Simulations
We start each of our simulations by giving all adults at t  0a ne n d o w -
ment of wealth of one unit. We then run the model for enough years into
the future until the distribution of wealth of sixty-seven-year-olds, as well
as the total amount of wealth in the economy, stabilizes. Since the asymp-
totic wealth distribution as well as the total level of wealth is independent
of the initial level and distribution of wealth, the fact that we start with
this particular initial endowment of wealth does not alter our results. In
practice, both the wealth distribution of sixty-seven-year-olds and the total
levelo fw e alth converge well before 150 years in each of our simulations.
Nonetheless, to guarantee consistency across simulations, we run each
simulation for 150 years.
3.3.12 Including Interest Rate Heterogeneity
Diﬀerent households face diﬀerent rates of return on their portfolios
because they systematically choose to hold diﬀerent portfolios. To incor-
porate rate-of-return heterogeneity, we use data on the portfolio holdings
of households from the 1995 SCF. Our ﬁrst step entails classifying those
household assets reported in the survey into several categories. Next, we
assign a rate of return to each asset category and compute the portfolio-
weighted rate of return that each household faces, given its portfolio of
assets.11 Finally, we compute the weighted frequency of households for
11. The asset categories are liquid assets, government bonds, private bonds and bond mu-
tual fund shares, stocks and stock mutual funds, real estate, and other nonﬁnancial assets.
Liability categories include mortgage and real estate debt and other debt. In forming a
weighted average rate of return on each household’s portfolio, we used the absolute value of
liabilities. For liquid assets, we assumed the geometric average annual real rate of return
(0.68 percent) on U.S. Treasury bills during the period 1926–97. For government bonds, we
use the geometric average annual real rate of return on long- and intermediate-term govern-
ment bonds between 1926 and 1997 (2.09 percent). For private bonds and bond mutual
funds, we use the geometric average rate of return on long-term corporate bonds between
1926 and 1997 (2.52 percent). For stocks and stock mutual funds, we use the weighted aver-
ageo fr ealr ates of return on large and small company stocks (8.00 percent). The weights for
the two stock market returns were obtained from analysts at the Wilshire 5000 company. The
source for the aforementioned average rates of return is the 1998 Yearbook published by
Ibbotson Associates. The average rates of interest on mortgages and other real estate debt
were constructed using data from Case and Shiller (1990), who report annualized excess
returns (excess over the three-month T-bill return) on home purchases for each quarter be-
tween 1971 and 1986 in four large U.S. metropolitan areas. We computed the total returns
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This frequency distribution is used to randomly allocate the average rate
of return within each step to households in the simulation. Households
are assumed to earn their assigned rate of return in each year of their lives.
3.3.13 Additional Issues of Calibration
Them o rtality probabilities used in the analysis are those released by
the U.S. Social Security Administration for 1995. The interest rate used
in the simulations is 4 percent. To obtain a realistic shape of the age-
consumption proﬁle, we assume that the time preference factors generate
a 1.5 percent growth in the planned path of consumption per equivalent
adult through age sixty-ﬁve.12 From ages ixty-six through eighty-eight,
planned consumption per equivalent adult remains constant. As men-
tioned,o urfertility matrixisderivedfromsimulating CORSIM.Itsfertility
module includesseparate logistic functionsfor thirty diﬀerentsubgroups of
women estimated using data from the National Longitudinal Survey.
The subgroups are distinguished by age, the presence of children, mari-
tal status, race, and work status. The regressors in the logits are age, dura-
tion of current marriage, earnings, family income, homeowner status, mar-
ital status, schooling status, work status, and duration since the birth of
the women’s two youngest children. In producing the larger birth matrix
from which we selected 2,000 rows, we ran the CORSIM model from its
start year of 1960 through 2000. In so doing, we used the entire panoply of
CORSIM modules to assign CORSIM agents the various socioeconomic
characteristics, such as work status, entering as regressors in the fertility
logits.
3.4 Findings
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 describe the distributions of wealth resulting from
eleven diﬀerent simulations. Our base-case simulation incorporates mor-
tality prior to age eighty-eight, assortative mating, heterogeneity in skills,
inheritance of skills, life-cycle consumption growth, heterogeneity in rates
of return, progressive income taxation, and a social security system with
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by adding the annualized real T-bill return for each quarter, then calculated the geometric
mean over the period of the study and averaged the rates of return over the four metropolitan
areas. This procedure yields a real rate of return of 0.45 percent. Finally, the rate of return
form o rtgage and real estate debt was calculated as the geometric average nominal mortgage
rate between 1973 and 1997 divided by the geometric average rate of inﬂation over the same
period. This yielded 3.91 percent. The average real rate on other debt was assumed to be
13.54 percent of the rate applicable for 1995, obtained from the Statistical Abstract for the
United States, 1998, table 820.
12. Actual consumption per equivalent adult prior to age sixty-six will diﬀer from planned
consumption if the household receives one or more inheritances.a ceiling on taxable income. The other ten simulations are variants on the
base case that leave out one, or, in the case of simulation eleven, two of
these elements.
The ﬁrst row in table 3.2 shows results for our base-case simulation,
including a wealth Gini of 0.336 and a consumption Gini of 0.283 among
age-sixty-six households. The consumption Gini is smaller because con-
sumption is ﬁnanced in part by Social Security beneﬁts, and these beneﬁts
arem ore evenly distributed than is net wealth. The ﬁrst row also indicates
that the steady-state ﬂow of total bequests in our model is 4.5 percent of
aggregate labor earnings, and the cross-generational ﬂow is 1.5 percent of
aggregate labor earnings. This cross-generational ﬂow of bequests appears
to be about half as large as in the actual U.S. economy. We say this because
ouro wn unpublished calculations using the 1962 and 1995 SCFs suggest
that cross-generational bequests in the actual economy are roughly 3 per-
cent of total labor compensation.13
Figure 3.1 graphs the ﬁrst row of table 3.3—the wealth distribution of
13. In forming these calculations, we ﬁrst benchmarked 1962 and 1995 SCF net worth and
life insurance holdings to Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and American Council of Life
Insurance respective reported aggregates. Next, we calculated the ﬂow of bequests by age
and sex by assuming that (a) single people with children leave their entire estates to their
children, (b) married decedents leave 15 percent of their estates to their children, and (c) all
decedents have the same age- and sex-speciﬁc mortality rates as those that prevailed in 1962
and 1994. Our estimated ratios of cross-generational bequests to total labor compensation
are 0.030 for 1962 and 0.033 for 1994.
Table 3.2 Inequality and Bequest Flows: Base Case and Alternative Simulations
Cross-
Wealth Consumption Bequest/ Generational
Case Simulation Gini Gini Earnings Bequest/Earnings
1 Base case 0.336 0.283 4.5 1.5
2N os kill diﬀerences 0.097 0.045 4.3 1.4
3N om arital sorting 0.324 0.270 4.6 1.5
4N o inheritance of skills 0.327 0.277 4.6 1.5
5N oc o nsumption growth 0.427 0.286 1.8 0.6
6N oi n terest rate
heterogeneity 0.332 0.279 4.5 1.4
7N op rogressive income
taxes 0.436 0.317 3.2 1.0
8N o inheritances 0.325 0.287 0.0 0.0
9N o Social Security 0.278 0.271 10.6 3.4
10 No ceiling on SS taxable
income 0.242 0.272 3.9 1.2
11 No inheritances and no
Social Security 0.285 0.278 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.age-sixty-six couples generated by our base-case simulation. It also com-
pares this distribution with wealth distributions of married couples whose
heads are aged sixty to sixty-nine in (a) the 1995 SCF and (b) the 1984
PSID. As the ﬁgure makes clear, the concentration of wealth at the very
topo fthe wealth distribution is much more substantial in the SCF. The
SCF wealth Gini is 0.73—more than twice as large as our simulated Gini.
Whyi so ur model generating too little skewness in the distribution of
wealth compared to the SCF? The answer, we believe, is that (a) the PSID
distribution of lifetime earnings is much less skewed than that of the actual
economy, and (b) the skewness of lifetime earnings makes a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the skewness in our simulated distribution of wealth. To see
the importance of our assumed degree of earnings inequality to our simu-
lated wealth inequality, consider the results in the second rows of tables
3.2 and 3.3, which omit labor earnings heterogeneity. Without skill diﬀer-
ences, the wealth Gini falls from 0.336 to 0.097. The fact that wealth in-
equality exists in the absence of skill inequality is due to diﬀerences across
households in the number of timing of their children as well as in the rates
of return earned on their saving.
The PSID earnings data from which we construct our male and female
distributions of lifetime earnings is certainly much less skewed than the
corresponding male and female cross-section distributions of earnings in
the SCF. This would explain why the simulated wealth distribution in our
base case is less concentrated than in the SCF.
However, it is harder to explain why the PSID’s wealth concentration in
the top tail is much greater than that simulated by the model. This may
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Fig. 3.1 Comparison of wealth distributions: simulated, SCF 1995, and
PSID 1984reﬂect a higher degree of underreporting of earnings among the rich than
of underreporting of their assets. One way to test this possibility is to com-
pare the distribution of wealth among the poorest (measured in terms of
wealth) of our age-sixty-six simulated couples with the corresponding dis-
tribution of wealth among the poorest half of the SCF sixty- to sixty-nine-
year-oldc o uples. Figure 3.2 makes this comparison. While our model ﬁts
the distribution of the truncated data quite well at the very top of the tail,
the ﬁt in the rest of the top tail is not very good.
3.4.1 Determinants of Wealth Inequality
Ther e maining simulations in tables 3.2 and 3.3 examine other determi-
nants of wealth inequality. Consider ﬁrst the case 3 simulation, which elim-
inates assortative mating. Given the limited assortative mating we ﬁnd in
the data and incorporate in the base case, it is not surprising that eliminat-
ing assortative mating altogether makes very little diﬀerence to simulated
wealth inequality. A second “nonfactor” with respect to the distribution
of wealth is the inheritance of skills from parents. The source of agents’
skills does not appear to have much impact on the cross-section distribu-
tion of wealth. This is clear from the case 4 simulation, which eliminates
the inheritability of skills, leaving the Gini at essentially its base-case value.
Thec ase 5 simulation eliminates consumption growth, which means
that it alters the model’s time-preference factors so that agents wish to
have the same living standard per equivalent adult as they age. This
smoothing of consumption generates more liquidity-constrained house-
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Fig. 3.2 Simulated and SCF-1995 distributions of wealth among bottom 50
percent of wealth holdersholds that arrive at age sixty-six with zero wealth, which result, in turn,
implies more wealth inequality. The wealth Gini in this case is 0.427—27
percent higher than in the base case.
Thec ase 6 simulation turns oﬀ interest rate heterogeneity, which makes
little diﬀerence to the distribution of wealth. The explanation here is that,
other things being equal, households earning higher rates of return can
aﬀordt oa nd do consume more at each point in time. Since accumulated
assets reﬂect accumulated diﬀerences between past levels of earnings and
consumption, this factor lowers the age-sixty-six wealth holdings of cou-
ples earning high rates of return. On the other hand, the smaller diﬀer-
encesb etween past earnings and consumption are accumulated at a higher
rate of return. This factor raises the age-sixty-six wealth holdings of high
rate of return couples. According to the results, these two factors roughly
cancel leaving wealth inequality essentially the same as in the case of no
interest rate heterogeneity. In contrast to interest rate heterogeneity, pro-
gressive income taxation does play an important role in inﬂuencing wealth.
In the case 7 simulation, this form of taxation is eliminated, raising the
Gini coeﬃcientf rom 0.336 to 0.436. Additionally, the share of wealth held
by the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution rises from 7 percent to
9.4 percent.
3.4.2 The Role of Inheritances and Social Security in Wealth Inequality
How important are bequests and their associated inheritances to wealth
inequality? The case 8 simulation addresses this question. It sets the proba-
bility of dying prior to age eighty-eight at zero. Compared to the base case,
this experiment reducesw e alth inequality only slightly. So, in the presence
of Social Security, inheritances make the distribution of wealth more
unequal. Is the same true if Social Security is absent? The answer, found
by comparing cases 9 and 11, is no. With inheritances, but without Social
Security, wealth inequality is somewhat smaller—the same ﬁnding re-
ported in Gokhale et al. (2001).
How much does Social Security itself raise wealth inequality? Compar-
ing the case 9 and 11 simulations reveals that the answer is a fair amount.
Adding Social Security to the model’s other features raises the wealth Gini
by over 20 percent. It also almost doubles the share of wealth held by the
top1p ercent of wealth holders. Figure 3.3 shows the impact of removing
Social Security on the wealth levels of age-sixty-six couples at diﬀerent
percentiles of the wealth distributions. For those in the 75th percentile,
eliminating Social Security would raise their age-sixty-six wealth by a fac-
toro f2.55. In contrast, for those in the top 1 percentile, eliminating Social
Security would raise their wealth by a factor of only 1.55.14
14. This diﬀerence would be greater still were we to assume that those who earn much
higher than average earnings also earn much higher than average rates of return.
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the reason, as previously mentioned, is that Social Security transforms
inheritances into a disequalizing force. According to table 3.2, it also re-
duces the intergenerational ﬂow of inheritances by over 50 percent. How-
ever, the main reason that Social Security is disequalizing is simply, as
conﬁrmed by the case 10 simulation, the ceiling that Social Security ap-
plies to its tax collection. This ceiling treats the lifetime rich more favor-
ably than the lifetime poor. It also diﬀerentially annuitizes the lower
classes. In the absence of the ceiling, the wealth Gini would be 0.242,
compared to 0.336 in the base case, and the share of wealth held by the top
1p ercent would be 2.9 percent, compared with 7 percent in the base case.
One can also assess the importance of Social Security to wealth inequal-
ityb yc onsidering how the wealth Gini varies with Social Security’s load
factor. As mentioned, our base case assumes that, for every dollar workers
payi nSocial Security payroll taxes, they receive thirty cents in retirement
beneﬁts, when both the taxes and beneﬁts are measured in presentv alue.
Am odest reduction in this load, such that workers receive back, in present
value, thirty-ﬁve cents on each dollar contributed, would raise the wealth
Gini from 0.336 to 0.363—that is, by about 10 percent. It would also,
incidentally, lower the ﬂows of both total and cross-generational bequests
by 13 percent.
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Fig. 3.3 Average wealth holding within selected percentiles of the age-66 wealth
distribution, with and without Social Security3.5 Conclusion
Given our use of the PSID, which undersamples very high-earning
Americans, to calibrate the distribution of lifetime earnings, it is not sur-
prising that our model fails to reproduce the extreme skewness of the top
tail of U.S. wealth distribution. On the other hand, our analysis conﬁrms
the proposition ﬁrst advanced by Feldstein (1976) and reemphasized by
Gokhale et al. (2001) that Social Security exacerbates wealth inequality
by leaving the lifetime poor with proportionately less to save, less reason
to save, and a larger share of their old-age resources in a nonbequeathable
form than the lifetime rich. In so doing, Social Security denies the children
of the poor the opportunity to receive inheritances. Consequently, inheri-
tances become a cause of wealth inequality rather than wealth equality.
All told, Social Security appears to be raising wealth inequality, as mea-
sured by the Gini coeﬃcient, by roughly one-ﬁfth, substantially increasing
the share of total wealth held by the richest members of society, and
greatly reducing the ﬂow of bequests to the next generation.
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Comment R. Glenn Hubbard
Ie njoyed this chapter very much, and I believe the research program in
whichJ agadeeshG o khale and Larry Kotlikoﬀ aree ngaged will make sig-
niﬁcant contributions to our understanding of the link between social in-
surance design and the distribution of wealth. The chapter’s purported
focus is Social Security, but this is true only in a narrow sense. The present
chapter is better seen as part of a broader research program by the authors
to explain the distribution of wealth and determinants of wealth inequality
(see especially Gokhale et al., forthcoming).
My comments are organized as follows. First, I pose some open ques-
tionst of r ame the analysis in the chapter. Second, I brieﬂy review the
chapter’s principal ﬁndings. Third, I focus on promising extensions of the
chapter in research and policy analysis.
Open Questions
In the background of the chapter lie two important questions. Why
might Social Security aﬀect the distribution of wealth, and what non–
Social Security factors explain the actual distribution of wealth?
At least four factors oﬀer a link between Social Security and the distri-
bution of wealth. First, intergenerational transfers in a pay-as-you-go sys-
temm ay reduce aggregate savinga nd capital accumulation,a nd crowd
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R. Glenn Hubbard is chairman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers, on leave
from posts as the Russell L. Carson Professor of Economics and Finance at Columbia Uni-
versity and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.out the private wealth accumulation of many households. Second, Social
Security may aﬀectp rivate intergenerational transfers and bequests. Third,
evenaf ully funded and actuarially fair Social Security system would re-
duce saving on account of imperfections in private annuity markets; house-
holds wishing to annuitize more of their household wealth may reduce
private saving accordingly. Fourth, even a funded, actuarially fair system
canaﬀectthe savingo fmanyh ouseholds in the presence of borrowing con-
straints (that is, when households cannot borrow against future beneﬁts).
These channels raise the open questions of why households save and
why someh ouseholds save very little. Early analysis of Social Security and
saving focused on eﬀects of the program on diﬀerent generations in a life-
cycle setting (Feldstein 1974; Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987). Within a gen-
eration, insurance-market and capital-market imperfections can connect
Social Security (and social insurance more broadly) to the distribution
of wealth (Abel 1985; Hubbard and Judd 1987; Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes 1995). Even relatively complicated versions of life-cycle models,
however, have diﬃculty in explaining the saving of the wealthy.
Toward that end, life-cycle models’ predictions often fail to match the
highly skewed distribution of wealth in U.S. microeconomic data. Why the
richs aves om ucho ver their lifetimes remains an open question, in spite
of recent analyses of heterogeneity in rates of time preference, market im-
perfections and precautionary saving, ﬁscal incentives, and household
variation in access to diﬀerent rates of return.
As I argue below, understanding links between Social Security and
household wealth accumulation and sources of heterogeneity in household
saving rates are important for interpreting the chapter’s results and policy
implications.
Findings of the Chapter
Under fairly reasonable assumptions, the model used by Gokhale and
Kotlikoﬀ canr eplicate many (though not all) features of the real-world
distribution of U.S. household wealth. As sources of wealth inequality, the
chapter focuses on uncertain lifetimes, skill diﬀerences within and across
generations, annuitization of Social Security “wealth,” and skewness in
the distribution of households’ lifetime earnings. In particular, the authors
argue that annuitization of Social Security wealth—an element of the cur-
rent Social Security system, but not necessarily an element of proposals
to introduce individual Social Security accounts—can worsen household
wealth inequality.
The chapter uses the CORSIM microsimulation model of the U.S. econ-
omy( see Caldwell et al. 1999) with parameters based on calibrations using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The basic model
has a life-cycle structure. Households have a stochastic lifetime of up to
eighty-eight periods. There are an equal number of males and females (fer-
TheI mpact of Social Security on the Distribution of Wealth 109tility assumptions yield an equal match), with no population growth across
cohorts. Marriage occurs at age twenty-two (the authors investigate both
random and assortative mating).1 In the base case, there are no diﬀerences
in skill endowments; alternative cases consider contemporaneous skill dif-
ferences (with and without assortative mating) and inherited skill diﬀer-
ences.
Households’ preferences are described by time-separable isoelastic func-
tionso ftheir own and future consumption, as well as that of their children
through age twenty-two. While the basic structure used by the authors is
standard among researchers employing life-cycle simulation models to
study household consumption decisions, that structure begs deeper ques-
tionsa bout saving decisions of very low- and very high-income households
that may prove crucial for analysis of wealth inequality.
In their simulations, the authors assume a very low intertemporal elas-
ticityo fsubstitution in consumption, so that households eﬀectively put
great weight on their “safe” resources in deciding how much to consume
at each point in time. The rate of interest is assumed to equal four percent
per annum; time preference factors yield 1.5 percent annual growth in
perc apitac o nsumption through age sixty-ﬁve. Mortality probabilities are
taken from 1995 calculations by the Social Security Administration. Basic
earnings and fertility matrices are taken from CORSIM. In general, the
chaptermightbeneﬁtfromabitmoredescriptionofthecalibrationexercise
and from sensitivity analysis; more discussion comparing the “earnings
module” with other eﬀorts using the PSID would also have been useful.2
The chapter’s principal results are contained in tables 3.1 and 3.2, which
report, respectively, for various simulations, Gini coeﬃcients, and shares
of total household wealth by wealth group. For the latter, the chapter also
reports tabulations from the Federal Reserve’s 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
Severalf eatures of the ﬁndings presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 are partic-
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1. Life doesn’t have quite the feeling of Thornton Wilder’s Our Town in the CORSIM
model. Gokhale et al. (forthcoming), for example, describe marriage and death as follows:
“22-year-old males and females were married to each other (at random, or according to their
skill ranks, depending on the case being considered),” and “Oldsters were killed oﬀ at ran-
doma ccording to the conditional probability of dying at their respective ages, and the ex-
isting wealth of those who just died was transferred to the surviving spouse (ﬁrst) or chil-
dren (equally).”
Previous simulation studies generally assumed that inheritances are unexpected and taxed
away and redistributed (see, e.g., Hubbard and Judd, 1987; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes,
1995; and Huggett 1996); this lack of emphasis on intentional bequests is consistent with the
empirical work of Hurd (1992) and Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ,a nd Sabelhaus (1996). Previous work
on intentional bequests and inheritability of skills (Flemming 1979) did not incorporate mar-
riage.
2. Exploring diﬀerences between the present paper and the CORSIM approach in Gokhale
et al. (forthcoming) might shed light on implications of key CORSIM assumptions. In the
present paper based on the PSID, for example, assortative mating on the basis of lifetime
earnings appears much less important than assumed by Gokhale et al. (forthcoming).ularly noteworthy. While the predicted bequest ﬂow in table 3.1 is signiﬁ-
cant, lifetime uncertainty per se (in the presence of Social Security) has a
relatively modest eﬀecto nthe wealth Gini; removing Social Security as
well strengthens this eﬀect.3 More signiﬁcant eﬀects are traceable to skill
diﬀerences. Removing desired consumption growth implies that house-
holds want to maintain an equivalent living standard as they age; as a
consequence of this consumption smoothing, more liquidity-constrained
households approach retirement with no wealth, increasing wealth in-
equality. Interest rate heterogeneity does not appear to be an important
determinant of the wealth Gini (I return below to whether heterogeneity
in rates of return is correctly measured). While the results of table 3.2
come closer to matching the SCF wealth shares than predictions of life-
cycle models with no intra-cohort wealth and income variation, the model
still fails to capture wealth accumulation at the top.
The villain of the inequality play is Social Security. In part, this reﬂects
Social Security’s eﬀecto nthe distribution of inheritances. That is, annuiti-
zation of Social Security beneﬁts increases inequality because high-income
households have substantial annuitized wealth. In the model, the diﬀeren-
tial eﬀecto fSocial Security annuitization traces principally to the fact
that the payroll tax ceiling beneﬁts high-lifetime-income households (see
case 10 in table 3.1).
Even within the structure of the model, these eﬀects of Social Security
on household variation in wealth accumulation may be overstated. The
authors’ assumption of a “pure tax” rate (i.e., tax rate net of that fund ben-
eﬁts to the household) of 67 percent substantially exceeds estimates pro-
duced, for example, by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (Mariger 1999).
More important, a portion of any pure tax represents the servicing of debt
incurred to provide unfunded beneﬁts to previous generation. Hence one
would not associate the removal of this tax with Social Security tax (as
long as promised beneﬁts will be paid from Social Security payroll tax rev-
enues).
Ultimately, the value of the authors’ approach to analyzing the contribu-
tion of Social Security to the distribution of household wealth derives at
least in part from the model’s eﬀectiveness in explaining the distribution
of wealth. While removing Social Security reduces the share of wealth held
by the top one percent of households from 7 percent to 3.8 percent, the
actual share in the 1995 data cited by the authors exceeds 30 percent.4
This discrepancy is surely a topic for future research.
While the chapter’s ﬁndings are thoughtful and suggestive, they seem to
3. In Gokhale et al. (forthcoming), the interaction of lifetime uncertainty and skill diﬀer-
encesc an be “leveling,” in the sense that larger inheritances are predicted to be received by
oﬀspring with skill levels lower than those of their parents.
4. In Gokhale et al. (forthcoming), the authors attempt to address this problem by increas-
ing the skewness of the distribution of lifetime earnings relative to that predicted by the PSID.
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on the “rich” and one on the “poor.” First, how can one model more pre-
cisely sources of skewness in earnings and rates of return? In the Survey
of Consumer Finances and the PSID, “entrepreneurs” (owners of active
businesses) ﬁgure prominently in the upper tail of the distribution of
wealth (see, for example, Gentry and Hubbard 1997, 1999; Quadrini 1997).
Fors uchh ouseholds, capital-market imperfections could link saving and
investment for such households, so that entrepreneural “selection” and
“investment” decisions can explain high preretirement saving rates for
these households and slow dissaving in retirement (Gentry and Hubbard
1999, 2000).5 Such considerations may be particularly important if wealth
is required to exploit (business-related) skill diﬀerences, and they suggest
the desirability of integrating determinants of household business saving
in life-cycle simulation models.
Second, for low-lifetime-income households, how should one think
about annuitization and welfare, as opposed to annuitization and saving?
With imperfections in annuity markets, Social Security’s mandatory annui-
tization may make these households better oﬀ,w hile reducing their saving
(Hubbard and Judd 1987). In addition, more research is needed to shed
light on the saving decisions of low-lifetime-income households—in par-
ticular, the extent to which they would save for retirement in the absence
of Social Security’s tax and mandatory annuitization elements.
While I believe these extensions are signiﬁcant, I want to end where I
began, complimenting Jagadeesh Gokhale and Larry Kotlikoﬀ for their
carefulm odeling and analysis of economic links between the structure of
Social Security and the distribution of household wealth. Their chapter
should be on the “recommended reading” list for serious students of Social
Security reform.
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Discussion Summary
Jeﬀrey B. Liebman was interested in the eﬀects of an investment-based
system on bequests. In such a system with preretirement bequests, individ-
uals from poor families will inherit more as a consequence of income re-
lated mortality. In addition, to the extent that individual accounts cause
peoplewith higher incomes to reduce other asset holdings resulting in little
net new ﬁnancial wealth, while lower-income individuals lack ﬁnancial
assets to substitute out of, individual accounts might make the wealth dis-
tribution more equal.
Martin Feldstein mentioned past work in which it was diﬃcult to recon-
cile the existing ﬁnancial wealth distribution with standard life-cycle sav-
ing models and the income distribution. However, if Social Security wealth
was included with ordinary ﬁnancial wealth, then the total wealth distribu-
TheI mpact of Social Security on the Distribution of Wealth 113tion wasm uchm orec onsistent with life-cycle saving models. If wealth is
to be a measure of future consumption potential, then the present value
of Social Security wealth should be included. However, liquid wealth pro-
vides options that an annuity (which may not have begun making pay-
ments) does not provide. For people who have not retired, wealth provides
the option to take time when searching for a new employer and the ability
to start a business or help one’s children start a business.T he presentv alue
of an annuity does not oﬀer any of these opportunities. Therefore, it may
be legitimate to focus on liquid wealth, especially when looking at
younger people.
Stephen C. Goss did not ﬁnd it particularly surprising that abolishing
the current Social Security system has a dramatic eﬀecto nw e alth when it
is assumed that Social Security contributions do not create any wealth.
He questioned whether it is appropriate to ignore Social Security wealth
completely. In response, the authors said that when people express concern
aboutw e alth inequality, they are usually not talking about Social Security
wealth. If social policy is to address this important issue, then it is impor-
tant to examine wealth inequality in the absence of Social Security wealth.
Angus Deaton felt that while the PSID is not perfect, the SCF data set
should not be considered the gold standard. Because the wealth distribu-
tion is very skewed, over-sampling the top end may help estimate the mean,
but the upper percentiles will still be subject to a large amount of estima-
tion error. For most models the wealth levels at the top of the distribution
aren ot important and this is the data missing from the PSID. Further-
more,i ti sn ot necessary to build exotic behavior into simulations to gener-
atel arge amounts of wealth inequality. The standard life-cycle model with
earnings uncertainty implies that wealth inequality at the date of retire-
ment is a very large number. Kotlikoﬀ expressed doubt that a standard life-
cycle model with earnings uncertainty could generate a Gini coeﬃcient
of 0.7.
R. Glenn Hubbard said that if the goal of the paper is to compare the
poor to the middle class, then the approach taken in these simulations is
ﬁne; however, if the goal is to examine inequality for the entire wealth
distribution, then it is important for the simulations to accurately reﬂect
the behavior of the very wealthy—a group for whom the data are not
very accurate.
Eytan Sheshinski emphasized the link between large unintended be-
quests and a lack of annuitization. He said it is a puzzle that middle and
upper class people convert such a small percentage of their wealth into an-
nuities.
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